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The idea that climate change is causing migration and displacement is entering the mainstream,
but experts have warned against using the term “climate refugees” to describe what we’re
seeing in small islands, coastal regions, and even conflict zones like Syria.
Geoff Dabelko’s 2007 post on climate change and migration was an early and important
clarification of this emerging phenomenon. He noted that the term “refugee” is problematic
because of limitations under international law. He also noted that migration is multi-causal. In
fact, the numerous triggers that collide to spur an individual’s decision to migrate make it
difficult to peg his or her movement to climate change. That difficulty also means that deriving a
number for climate migrants remains elusive. Almost 10 years later, these cautionary words are
still relevant.
However, I would argue there are migration and displacement scenarios that are a bit more
straightforward now, that beg concerted effort from the policy community, and that underscore









In their comprehensive policy paper, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate
Change, Walter Kälin and Nina Schrepfer identify five scenarios in which climate change may
trigger population movements. They are:
1. Sudden onset disasters, such as flooding or storms;
2. Slow-onset degradation, such as rising sea levels and salinization of freshwater and arable
land;
3. The “special case” of slow-onset disasters, specifically the impact of rising seas on low-
lying small-island states;
4. Governments prohibiting areas for human habituation as they become high risk;
5. Violence, armed conflict, or unrest over dwindling resources that seriously disturbs public
order and triggers migration.
Scenarios three and four are particularly relevant given current events. News of the seemingly
inevitable demise of atoll nations like Kiribati and the planned relocation of the Biloxi-
Chitimacha-Choctaw tribe of Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana have highlighted the impacts of
climate change on island and coastal communities in the present tense. Sea-level rise and coastal
flooding that compromise entire communities is not a problem we can relegate to future
generations; it is happening now.
This is not to say “climate refugees” is an appropriate way to describe
these people. There is still no legal basis behind the term, no
protections owed by governments, and a real danger of giving the
wrong impression about the situations they face as opposed to the
millions displaced by war and persecution in the Middle East and East
Africa, for example (though elements of this may evince scenario five).
It is important to note that many residents of threatened islands in fact
eschew the “refugee” categorization and resist the inevitability of
losing their lands, home to the bones of their ancestors and the birthplace of the next
generation.
There is value in emphasizing how complex the drivers of human migration are, as many
treatments of the climate-migration nexus do. There are also pre-existing vulnerabilities that are
the result of human decisions and limited development capacity, which is true in the Global
North and South. But the potential uninhabitability of threatened islands like Kiribati in a
matter of decades is not a kind of migration that suffers convincingly from claims of multi-
causality – at least not to the point that obscures a climate fingerprint. The specter of complete
displacement that i-Kiribati now face is more clearly a function and consequence of a changing
climate.
But it is an argument for working towards some kind of framework that acknowledges the
special climate-related circumstances faced by small-islanders and those displaced by
government climate resilience programs – and the international community’s responsibilities to
them. These are not people wealthy countries are simply tasked with accommodating, they are
in part victims of a phenomenon that they have had little hand in creating, which deserves some
recognition, if not reparation. Whether we help small islanders adapt to or circumvent climate
change’s displacement effects – at least for as long as possible – new policies are urgently
needed.





From the Arctic to the Pacific Northwest to the Mississippi Delta, the U.S. federal government,
with state and local partners, is now considering and indeed facilitating movement from high
risk areas, the fourth scenario outlined by Kälin and Schrepfer. In Louisiana, Isle de Jean
Charles is among the first set of communities undergoing planned relocation. Recognizing the
significant loss of land – a result of rising seas colliding with decades of channelization and oil
and gas development – and the increased risk of staying in place as each hurricane season
approaches, the Department of Housing and Urban Development has funded the relocation of
island residents.
This is a first for the U.S. government, and a number of questions arise as we contemplate more
and more communities moving to higher ground: How exactly do we conduct this process
equitably? How will it be fully funded? How are people relocated in a way that affords them
opportunities to thrive? These are not questions for leaders and communities in 2050, but in
2016.
Disappearing islands and re-locating coastal communities highlight
the increasing weight climate change contributes to displacement and
migration. At the very least, the policy community can carve out these
two scenarios as priorities in acknowledging the triggering role of
climate change. One has important international policy implications,
the other mainly domestic (though depending on the country in
question, re-location may involve international support).
It is possible that, as time passes, the climate fingerprint in the remaining scenarios outlined by
Kälin and Schrepfer, including the most thorny – violent conflict – will also become more
evident. It is quite plausible that the others will always be seen as the result of multiple triggers,
but that climate change, once the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back, will be
understood to be more like an entire bale of hay.
It is critically important not to overstate climate change’s involvement in contemporary
population movements, lest we absolve poor leadership and decision-making. But climate
change induces movement that seems to me altogether different from your average multi-causal
event in at least one other way: it is not a static phenomenon; it is dynamic. It is an increase in
average global temperature with accompanying change – and the rate of change is increasing
with greater speed. In other words, what may seem like a deeply entangled multi-causal event
today might soon have quite a strong climate signal.
If we recognize the nature and pace of climate change, we might – as Dabelko presciently urged
in 2007 – “translate this larger theoretical and political argument into…specific interventions”
that aid those who today face a seemingly inexorable rupture to their way of life.
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